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The Expansion of Intellectual Property
Rights by International Agreement:
A Case Study Comparing Chile and
Australia's Bilateral FTA Negotiations
With the U.S.
BY: RALPH FISCHER*
I. INTRODUcTION
Recently, the United States of America has signed bilateral
free trade agreements with Chile and Australia that will greatly
impact the intellectual property regimes of both Australia and
Chile.' For example, both Chile and Australia are now required to
essentially pass a form of the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation ("WIPO") Copyright and Performances and Phonograms
Treaties and provide greater rights to other intellectual property,
like trademarks.2 While the U.S. implementation of these treaties
resulted in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), it
I Ralph Fischer has a B.S.E. in Chemical Engineering from Case Western Reserve
University and a J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. He currently works
as an associate at Klett Rooney Lieber & Schorling, P.C., is a registered patent agent with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and a Samuelson/Glushko Fellow. Much
thanks to Meghan Swanson, Maureen Fischer, Michael Madison, George Yokitis, Mindy
Shreve, Ann Sinsheimer, and Nelson P. Cohen for all the time and effort they so gener-
ously provided. This paper was made possible by the Samuelson/Glushko Fellowship.
1. See Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overview
of Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negoti-
tions/us fta/outcomes/08_intellectual-property.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); Ways and
Means Committee, United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, at 15-16,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738chilesummary.pdf (last visited
Sept. 13, 2005).
2. See Australian Government, supra note 1; ROBIN D. GROSS, CHILE-US FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) ON CIRCUMVENTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION
MEASURES (TPMS) THAT CONTROL COPYRIGHTED WORKS (Sept. 1, 2004),
http://www.ipjustice.org/Chile-USFTA.shtml#.
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may not be necessary for these countries to create such stringent
laws to meet the treaties' terms.3 However, prior to the execution
of these FTAs, these countries were unwilling to implement the
WIPO treaties because of their concerns with enacting intellectual
property laws that could be detrimental to their citizens' well be-
ing.
Chile and Australia's FTAs with the U.S. illustrate the expan-
sion of IPRs through multilateral or bilateral treaties. Many com-
mentators and activists are concerned by such developments. Spe-
cifically, many feel intellectual property rights have expanded to
the detriment of "less sophisticated" signatories of such treaties
However, recent developments have shown that less developed
countries are not necessarily as unsophisticated as originally
6thought. For example, less developed countries have used regime
shifting within various intergovernmental and NGO forums to cre-
ate favorable outcomes for their desired policies. 7
This paper is designed to explore the premise that less devel-
oped countries are less sophisticated negotiators and are overly
susceptible to the pressures of vast economic powers, like the
United States or the European Union ("EU").8 To test the viabil-
ity of this premise, this paper uses a case study comparing a less
developed country's negotiations to that of a developed country's
negotiations with the same vast economic power. In so doing, it
compares Chile and Australia's recently successful completion of
3. GROSS, supra note 2.
4. AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media - Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement,
http://austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefs3.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Issues
Likely to Arise in an Agreement].
5. See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819 (2003); Peter Drahos, Trading in Public
Hope, 592 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 18, 24-30 (2004). See generally IP Justice,
available at http://www.ipjustice.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); Posting of Lessig to
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/cat international.shtml (Feb. 21, 2005, 01:38 PST).
6. Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (2004) ("[De-
veloping countries and NGOs] use regime shifting to maximize desired policy outcomes,
to relieve pressure for action in other international venues, to create treaties and soft law
in tension with TRIPS, and to lay the political groundwork needed to integrate new prin-
ciples, norms, and rules of intellectual property protection into the WTO and WIPO.").
7. id.
8. See, e.g., Mario E. Carranza, Mercosur, The Free Trade Area of the Americas,
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1058-60
(2004); Drahos, supra note 5, at 24-30.
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bilateral free trade agreement ("FTA") negotiations with the
United States. This case study will evaluate the historical and
socio-economic conditions in both countries and how these condi-
tions may have impacted the respective countries' negotiations.
The results may show that less developed countries are not nearly
as unsophisticated as commentators make them out to be.
Additionally, the case study provides insights into other theo-
ries. Specifically, it may indicate whether multilateral or bilateral
treaty negotiations are the more equitable forum for negotiating
the metes and bounds of intellectual property rights ("IPRs"). Re-
lated to this determination is the question of whether non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") should be involved in IPR
related negotiations between less developed countries and devel-
oped countries in an attempt to make such negotiations more equi-
table.9
The results of this case study and their relation to these topics
are discussed more fully below. Section II of this paper provides
background on multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, the bu-
reaucratic systems created by such agreements, and the implica-
tions these systems have on intellectual property rights and intel-
lectual property law development. Sections III and IV are case
studies of Chile and Australia that provide historical, socio-
economic, and political background for both countries. Moreover,
each section explores the negotiation process used in making a bi-
lateral agreement with the U.S. Section V evaluates the findings of
9. Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The
Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937,
987 (2003) ("NGOs can put a human face on the WTO. However, like the humans the
NGOs represent, they need to be included."); but see Hasmy Agam, Working With NGOs:
A Developing World Perspective, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 42 (2002) ("In-
deed, some NGOs in developing countries have assumed the attributes or functions of op-
position political parties, without the responsibility and accountability of a political party.
Although operating with virtual impunity, they expect governments to unquestioningly
accept their criticisms and meekly accede to their demands."); Gregory F. Jacob, Perspec-
tive, Without Reservation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 297 (2004) ("NGOs exert tremendous in-
fluence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right on matters of sub-
stance, but rather because they are providing the only pro bono legal services available to
delegates with no legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly did
not act as disinterested legal advisers, and along the way more than one delegation was
hoodwinked into believing the NGOs' all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth.")
(emphasis omitted); See generally, Erik B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process: Analyzing
TRIPS Participatory Guarantees in Light of Protected Indigenous Rights, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 671 (Sept. 2004).
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this case study, exploring the similarities and differences found in
each country's negotiation strategy, and the rationale behind ac-
cepting the terms of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Further, it
explores the implications this case study may have on various
theories commentators have developed in connection with intellec-
tual property law evolution and free trade agreements.
II. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS, AND
THE RESULTING BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
Countries that are net exporters of technology and copyright
products created a new strategy to expand the scope of IPRs at-
tributable to these products. ° The strategy revolved around three
sometimes overlapping concepts: (1) the creation of effective dis-
pute settlement for substantive intellectual property rights, (2) the
expansion of the definition of investment to include intellectual
property rights, and (3) the non-violation complaint alleging nulli-
fication or impairment of benefits.11 The U.S., the lead exporter of
technology and copyright products, started to implement this
strategy in the mid-1990's.
12
In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") came into effect, successfully implementing this strat-
egy. 3 It was later expanded to all the members of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") in 1995, when the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") "came
into force and required all WTO members to provide minimum
standards of intellectual property protection.' 4 Since the signing
of these two agreements, various bilateral and other multilateral
agreements and negotiations have taken place attempting to
broaden the reach and enforcement of intellectual property rights
to various other countries..5
10. See Allen Z. Hertz, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Con-
ference: NAFTA Revisited: Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, In-
vestor Protection Agreements, and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261,
261-62 (1997).
11. Id. at 261-62.
12. Id. at 265.
13. Id. at 265 ("For international IP protection a new era began with the entry into
force on January 1, 1994 for Canada, the United States, and Mexico of the NAFTA.").
14. Maria Julia Oliva, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and
Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 45, 51 (2003).
15. See id. at 47; see also Hertz, supra note 10, at 262.
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A. TRIPS
The TRIPS agreement expanded and universalized the mini-
mum levels of intellectual property protection for industrialized
countries "only after reaching a certain level of development.
1 6
The agreed upon scope of protection for IPRs "limited the options
for developing countries in the design of their intellectual property
systems."1 However, the TRIPS Agreement still allowed countries
to adopt different strategies and definitions that could affect the
scope and enforceability of these rights. 18 This flexibility is "critical
for countries to be able to use their intellectual property legislation
as a means of achieving a set of economic development, social de-
velopment, and environmental protection objectives."19
To ease the economic and legislative burdens these new stan-
dards created, simultaneous implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement provisions was not universally required.20 "Developed
countries like Canada or the United States had to apply all TRIPS
provisions by January 1, 1996."21 However, developing-country
WTO Members did not have to apply most TRIPS provisions until
January 1, 2000.22 In 2000, developing countries yet to extend
product-patent protection to all technology areas could further de-
lay the domestic application of these protections to any area not
covered (e.g., pharmaceuticals) until 2005.23 A least-developed
WTO member could delay the implementation of most TRIPS
provisions until the start of 2006, at which time the country could
further extend this transitional period by successfully persuading
the TRIPS Council to exclude its transition period.24
However, commentators have questioned the flexibility
TRIPS allegedly provides.5 Specifically, the TRIPS Agreement's
use of the Dispute Settlement Understanding has limited member
state's policy choices due to the mandatory supranational adjudi-
16. Oliva, supra note 14, at 52.
17. Id.
18. Id. ("For instance, the TRIPS Agreement does not define 'invention,' thus al-
lowing countries to choose the definition that responds to their own needs.").
19. Id.
20. Hertz, supra note 10, at 265.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 265-66.
25. Okediji, supra note 5, at 820.
20061
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cation that may be incurred by another member state's com-
plaint. These adjudications have resulted in the disallowance of
various member states' attempts to implement various aspects of
TRIPS, while still maintaining some domestic favoritisms or preju-
dices that were arguably within the scope of the Agreement's
27terms.
Some commentators believe that multilateral neotiations are
a more favorable forum for less developed countries. In contrast,
others believe that, at least in the instance of TRIPS, less devel-
oped countries negotiated away even more rights and flexibility
than they would have in a bilateral setting with a superior power.
Thus, there is some dispute over whether the bilateral or multilat-
eral is the more equitable negotiation forum. It is quite possible
that, contrary to U.S. coercion theorists' claims, it is wiser for less
developed countries to use bilateral and regional multilateral
agreements to negotiate with a larger, more developed country. °
B. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
Since the signing of TRIPS, bilateral agreements have been
the most active international intellectual property law forum.31
Generally, these agreements are between a developed country,
26. Id. at 822-23.
27. Specifically, examples comprise of Indian, American, and Canadian legislative
actions that have been altered or overruled by such challenges. See id. at 891-910.
28. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 62 (2002)
("Matters are perhaps worse still when the U.S. acts unilaterally .... "); see also GENETIC
RES. ACTION INT'L, "TRIPS-PLUS" THROUGH THE BACK DOOR: How BILATERAL
TREATIES IMPOSE MUCH STRONGER RULES FOR IPRS ON LIFE THAN THE WTO (2001),
http://www.grain.org/publications/trips-plus-en.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) ("[T]he qui-
etly crafted mini-pacts between Washington and Amman, or Brussels and Dhaka, are
where more damage is sometimes being done."); Various other academics and commenta-
tors believe multilateral settings are the more equitable forum. See generally Issues Likely
to Arise in an Agreement, supra note 4.
29. Okediji, supra note 5, at 850 ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement guaranteed a surplus for
developed countries greater than what each state could otherwise have obtained on its
own, as well as a surplus for developing countries in the form of enhanced trade conces-
sion in the areas of textiles and agriculture.").
30. Id. If the developed countries have similar special interests groups and are capa-
ble of adequate collaboration due to similar or special interests, then their aggregate nego-
tiating power appears to be substantially larger than what any one developed country
(even the U.S.) may have alone, in negotiations with one or perhaps a whole region of less
developed countries which are similarly situated and share similar policy objectives or in-
terests.
31. Oliva, supra note 14, at 52-53.
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like the United States, and a less developed country, like Chile.32
Most commentators believe that the less developed countries
agree to provide stronger IPRs, or TRIPS-plus, protections in ex-
change for greater access to the developed country's markets and
investors.33 The TRIPS-plus provisions define various IPRs or ex-
pand the scope or standard of an IPR beyond the minimal TRIPS
standard, thereby reducing the flexibility provided in the TRIPS
Agreement.34 This same model is used for multilateral negotiations
including the Central American Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA"), the Middle East Free Trade Area ("MEFTA"), or
the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA").35
Recently, the United States has been extremely prolific in its
bilateral negotiations, reaching agreements with Singapore, Mo-
rocco, Chile, Australia, El Salvador, Jordan, and eight other coun-
tries.36 The United States has also negotiated extensively with
other Latin American and Caribbean countries on the FITAA. 3
Moreover, the U.S. is working toward a Middle East Free Trade
Area by 2013 and is in bilateral negotiations with five countries
within the Southern African Customs Union.3 s
The United States, as the largest exporter of intellectual
property driven goods, seeks to expand IPRs' scope and enforce-
ment.3 9 Moreover, because the U.S. represents about one fifth of
the world economy, it has the most to offer less developed coun-
tries in terms of market access and investment opportunity.40 Thus,
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Consulate General Mumbai, India, U.S. and Bah-
rain Sign Free Trade Agreement (Sept. 14, 2004), http://mumbai.usconsulate.gov (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2005).
36. Id.
37. Id. (explaining that in addition to the FTAA negotiations, the U.S. is involved in
bilateral negotiations with Panama, Peru, Columbia, and Ecuador).
38. In Africa, the U.S. is bilaterally negotiating with Botswana, Swaziland, South
Africa, Lesotho, and Namibia. In Asia, beyond the Middle East, it is also negotiating with
Thailand. See id.
39. See Patrick Coleman, The U.S. Competitive Advantage in Intellectual Property
Trade, 27 CHEMTECH 48 (1997), http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/chemtech/97/sep/comp.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
40. Vivek Arora & Athanasios Vamvakidis, Economic Spillovers, FIN. & DEV.,
Sept. 2005, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/09/arora.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2005). See generally NationMaster.com, Map & Graph: Economy: GDP,
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco-gdp# (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (using 2002
2006]
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it is not surprising that the U.S. is so active and successful in ex-
41panding TRIPS-plus protection to so many countries.
C. Non Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations
A third and emerging party to these bilateral and multilateral
negotiations is non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), which
have increasingly challenged the TRIPS Agreement and various
bilateral or multilateral agreements expanding TRIPS-plus protec-
tions.42 With the NGOs' political, or mass media, clout, less devel-
oped countries have become capable of renegotiating supposedly
settled treaties. For example, less developed countries, acting in
tandem with NGOs, were able to extract the Public Health Decla-
ration during a new round of WTO trade talks in Doha.43 This
Declaration applies to patented medicines, providing less devel-
oped countries access to such pharmaceuticals by granting them a
longer transitional time before providing IPRs with such prod-
ucts.44 In addition to NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, like
the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization, are becoming involved in international negotiations af-
fected by intellectual property issues.45
This development has increased the number of forums avail-
able to different states and parties through which to affect policy,
thereby maximizing their respective interests.46 Moreover, the
various institutional structures, as designed, can provide a built-in
bias in favor of developing countries. For example, WIPO adminis-
ters implementation of existing intellectual property agreements
values).
41. See Office of United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SectionIndex.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2005).
42. Heifer, supra note 6, at 4, 6.
43. Id. at 5. This declaration is often referred to as the Doha Declaration. World
Trade Organization, TRIPS and Public Health, http://www.wto.org/english/tra-
top.e/trips-e/pharmpatent-e.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2005). See generally World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tripse/ pharmpatente.htm.
44. Helfer, supra note 6, at 5.
45. Id. at 6. For example, these intergovernmental organizations have had intellec-
tual property issues at or near the top of their agenda negotiations at the Convention on
Biological Diversity Conference of the Parties and the Commission on Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 8.
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and provides dispute settlement services, generating the revenue
needed to fund its activities. Moreover, WIPO's staff provides
technical assistance and training to member states and their na-
tional intellectual property offices, the bulk of which is provided to
developing countries. To further meet these developing coun-
tries' needs, and to raise more revenue, WIPO has expanded these
services to include standing, expert, and intergovernmental com-
mittees. These committees carry out studies on particular intellec-
tual property topics and generate soft law guidelines and recom-
mendations for consideration by WIPO member states. 49 Thus,
while WIPO attempts to provide services to facilitate the imple-
mentation of negotiated intellectual property agreements, it also
interacts most often with and directly impacts the policies of de-
veloping countries. This likely creates some conflict of interest
since the same organization, made up of the same personnel,
greatly affects various states' policies and also adjudicates the va-
lidity of such policies in light of the various agreements they must
follow. ° This may be especially true in light of WIPO's increas-
ingly important role in influencing both TRIPS dispute settlement
and member states' proposals to amend or supplement TRIPS.51
Consequently, it would seem that these organizations would have,
at the least, some slight bias towards the developing countries with
52which they often interact.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id.; Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 933,
949 (2003).
49. Heifer, supra note 6, at 12.
50. But see Sell, supra note 48, at 949 (explaining that WIPO receives 85-90% of its
budget from PTC application filing fees. The majority of these filings result from large bio-
tech or biolife science corporations.).
51. Helfer, supra note 6, at 26.
52. See id. at 14, 20. One consequence of this bias may be the United States and
European Community (EU) shifting of intellectual property lawmaking from WIPO to
GATT due to dissatisfaction with treaty negotiations hosted by WIPO. Id. at 20-21. More-
over, GATT is more likely biased in favor of the U.S. and the EU because these parties
enjoy substantial negotiating leverage in this forum. Id. at 21. See also id. at 61 ("[R]egime
shifting enhances developing states' bargaining power within the WTO and WIPO. It fa-
cilitates a proactive negotiating strategy, enabling governments and NGOs to coordinate
their efforts around hard and soft law proposals first vetted and refined in other interna-
tional venues."); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 424 (2004) ("[Olur nodal world is replete
with opportunities for alliances, par.tnerships, and forum shifting, all of which enable the
weak to exercise influence over agendas.").
2006]
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D. Negotiation Forum Selection
Ultimately, the decision to use either a bilateral or multilat-
eral forum can have a large strategic impact on a country's nego-
tiations. Generally, a multilateral forum decreases a country's con-
trol over negotiations because there are many more countries
53involved in the negotiations, each with their own interests. As a
result, a country's control over negotiations is diluted due to the
coalitions which generally must be formed based on similar inter-
ests to negotiate a final outcome.54 In fact, the number of countries
involved and their political influence are the most important fac-
tors to determine whether the multilateral or bilateral negotiation
is the most strategically desirable forum.5 For example, large mul-
tilateral forums can be detrimental to developing countries where
the developed countries (e.g., U.S., U.K., and Canada) have simi-
lar objectives to most proposals and tradeoffs to offer, while the
56developing countries' tradeoffs and objectives are more varied. In
this type of setting, developed countries can essentially implement
a "divide and conquer" strategy, playing the weaker factions off of
each other, to more effectively- and substantially enhance their ne-
gotiating power than in a bilateral forum.57 Moreover, a single
country, or even a small group can less afford the option of "walk-
ing away" from any deal when a multilateral forum includes a
large portion of the world. In order to continue to be a viable
global trading partner, other countries involved in the negotiations
are likely to decide on standards that these countries will eventu-
53. Okediji, supra note 5, at 838-68.
54. Id. at 849, 884-85.
55. Okediji, supra note 5, at 884-85 ("In the area of intellectual property particu-
larly, state power is a critical variable for predicting outcome because intellectual 'prop-
erty' is inherently a product of the exercise of state regulatory powers.").
56. Id. at 849-850. ("While the proposals submitted by respective states generally fell
within the categories of 'developed' and 'developing' countries, the divisions were neither
that exact nor predictable. Indeed, over the period of negotiations, the coalition formation
between developed countries altered as different issues arose. The same was true for de-
veloping countries. Within these descriptive categories, several different coalition configu-
rations emerged with some countries ostensibly acting independently.); Id. at 849 n.96
("For example, the Andean Group (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) and the
Group of Ten (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania,
and Yugoslavia) focused on different issues at different stages of the negotiations. The
Group of Ten had early on opposed the idea of TRIPS while the Andean Group was in-
volved in making proposals at later stages of negotiations.").
57. Ruth L. Okediji discusses this in great detail. See id. at 838-68.
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ally have to accept.
E. IPR Negotiation Theories
There are generally three types of theories that attempt to
explain the use of bilateral and multilateral FTAs to expand IPRs:
(1) U.S. or EU coercion of less powerful economic countries58 , (2)
multinational corporation lobbying,59 and (3) autonomous policy
agreements, which are made to maximize a constituency's well be-
ing.60 The theories falling within the first category essentially argue
that an international hegemon can mostly impose and enforce its
desired rules and international policies upon weaker powers. 6 As a
result of the hegemon's power, it will usually act through inde-
pendent decision-making or through bilateral negotiation to
maximize the relational power disparity.62
Multinational corporate lobbying theories essentially argue
that multinational corporations effectively lobby all parties, even
resorting to developing "false hopes," which is a type of subter-
fuge, in order to obtain international policies favoring their busi-
63ness interests. Thus, large multinational corporations or entire
industries explicitly or implicitly collude to obtain beneficial poli-
cies.64 These entities usually lobby all, or a substantial number, of
the parties of a negotiation to obtain the desired result.65
A third category of theories, i.e., autonomous policy agree-
ment theories, contend that all parties to a negotiation come to an
agreement that best serves the public welfare of their constituen-66....
cies. The parties achieve these objectives by implementing van-
67ous negotiating tactics or strategies. While special interests andNGOs may play some role in the development of each party's ne-
58. See Carranza, supra note 8, at 1032-41; cf Ian L.G. Wadley, Between Empire and
Community: The United States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment:
Environment- U.S. and Them: Hubs, Spokes & Integration with Reference to Transbound-
ary Environment and Resources Issues, 21 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 572, 572-73 (2003).
59. See Drahos, supra note 5, at 24-30.
60. See Carranza, supra note 8, at 1058-61.
61. Id. at 1034, 1038.
62. Id. at 1036.
63. See Drahos, supra note 5, at 19.
64. Id. at 25.
65. Id. at 25, 30.
66. See Carranza, supra note 8, at 1053.
67. See id.
2006]
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gotiation strategy, these theories suggest that the parties are so-
phisticated enough to determine what is actually in its constitu-• 68
ency's best interests and act correspondingly.
F. Case Study - Testing Hypotheses
This paper will test each of these three theories against real
world bilateral FTA negotiations. A case study comparing negotia-
tions between the U.S. and Chile with negotiations between the
U.S. and Australia will be used to test the viability of these theo-
ries.
In this case study, Chile will represent a less developed coun-
try negotiating with an alleged hegemon, the U.S.69 Chile is used
because it has recently signed an FTA with the U.S. and it is gen-
erally representative of less developed countries. For example,
Chile relies on natural resources and agriculture for a majority of
its exports and domestic economy.7° Further, Chile has only re-
cently become a democracy, having been led by a military junta
until around 1990.71
.Australia, on the other hand, will be used to represent a de-
veloped country negotiating with a more powerful, but similarly
sophisticated power, the U.S. Australia has a sophisticated econ-
omy, with services being its economy's largest sector." Moreover,
Australia has been politically and economically stable, and has ex-
perienced great economic growth over the past twenty years.73
68. See id.; One example of this type of theory would be that the American negotia-
tors knowingly act to maximize IPRs because it will maximize the net benefit to its citizens
and a less developed country agrees in return for American concessions that will also yield
a maximum net benefit to its citizens. Id.
69. See Carranza, supra note 8, at 1058-60.
70. Export Council for Energy Efficiency, Market Assessment of Chile, (1999),
http://www.ecee.org/pubs/assess/Chile/Chile.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (Chile's Econ-
omy and Investment Conditions Chapter/Section was specifically referenced.).
71. JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF
CHILE 199-200 (1998).
72. Economist Intelligence Unit, Australia Economic Structure, THE ECONOMIST
(Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.economist.com/countries/Australia/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-
Economic%20Structure (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
73. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK AUSTRALIA, available at http://www.cia.govlcialpub-
lications/factbook/geos/as.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter WORLD
FACTBOOK AUSTRALIA].
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III. CHILE
In this case study, Chile is a good example of a less developed
country because it embodies many characteristics common among
less developed nations. For instance, Chile only recently became a
democracy after a fifteen-year junta following a coup of the de-
mocratically elected socialist government. In large part, the junta
occurred due to mismanagement, massive corruption, and hyperin-
74flation. Thus, Chile is a less developed country essentially re-
building its economic and political infrastructure, a situation com-
mon among any new government established amid the current
turmoil of many less developed countries (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Ukraine). Similarly, Chile is rich in agricultural
(e.g., fruit) and mineral resources (e.g., copper) 6 This situation is
similar to many other less developed countries that are rich in
77natural resources.
Based on various theories presented by commentators, one
might expect Chile's bilateral FTA with the U.S. to have resulted
from various scenarios: it could be a result of the U.S. leveraging
its "hegemonic" power by attempting to coerce Chile into an
FTA,78 it could be Chile's attempt to further its economic policy by
negotiating away IPRs for greater access to the U.S. market,79 or it
could be the result of massive multinational corporations further-
ing their own economic interests.8°
In order to test these theories, a brief background of Chile's
recent history is necessary to appreciate and understand the poten-
tial motivations and objectives that may have been implicated in
74. See HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 102-07.
75. See The World Bank, 10 Things You Never Knew About the World Bank, at 7,
http://www.worldbank.org/tenthings/lOthings2004-english.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
76. See CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK CHILE, available at, http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ci.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2005) [hereinafter WORLD
FACTBOOK CHILE].
77. See generally Wikipedia, Development Geography, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Development-geography (last modified, Sept. 9, 2005).
78. See Ruth Gana Okediji, Symposium on Globalization at the Margins: Perspec-
tives on Globalization from Developing States: Copyright and Public Welfare in Global
Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 133 (1999).
79. Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Chile, 7-12, WT/TPR/6/124
(Nov. 4, 2003).
80. Drahos, supra note 5, at 19-20; See generally Christopher T. Marsden, Cyberlaw
and International Political Economy: Towards Regulation of the Global Information Soci-
ety, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 355,399-401 (2001).
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entering into an FTA with the U.S.
A.Democracy Produced by a Totalitarian Response to the Failures
of Socialism
Chile has likely enjoyed the most political and economic sta-
bility of any country in South America for the last ten to fifteen
81years. In fact, over the last six years it has experienced annual in-
flation below 5% and realized an 8% annual GDP growth
throughout the 1990s.81 It seems hard to believe Chile was a coun-
try in chaos around 1970.
Under the Frei government, the Chileanisation, i.e., nationali-
zation, of major copper mines and an agrarian reform allowing the
Chilean government to expropriate any landholdings of more than
80 hectares was implemented.83 These reforms included the na-
tionalization of copper mines formerly controlled by American in-
vestors.8 These socialist reforms were initially passed into law dur-
ing the, mid-1960s. 85 They were originally hailed as successful and
were progressively expanded in the early 1970s by the Frei gov-
ernment. Moreover, this trend in nationalization extended to
Chilean banks and other important financial and manufacturing
concerns by 1972.87
Because these reforms were initially successful, the socialist
political parties responsible for them gained support, instituted
wage increases and froze prices in late 1971. 88 The expansion of
such reforms ultimately led to skyrocketing inflation and massive
89governmental budget problems. While the Chilean economy grew
81. World 66, Chile History, http://www.world66.com/southamerica/chile/history
(last visited Sept. 13, 2005), compare with Peter Hakim, Scandalous Brazil; Revelations of
government corruption could turn a Latin American success story on its head -- and take
U.S. interests with it, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at B13 and Kimberly A. Czub, Argentina's
Emerging Standard of Intellectual Property Protection: A Case Study of the Underlying
Conflicts Between Developing Countries, TRIPS Standards and the United States, 33 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191 (2001).
82. U.S. Department of State, U.S. - Chile Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet, July
22, 2003, http://www.state.gov (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
83. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 78-79.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 98-99.
87. Id. at 95-96.
88. Id at 102.
89. Id. at 102-103 (explaining that from 1970-71, Chile's governmental budget went
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at around 7.7% in 1971, it also experienced 22% inflation. 90 By
1972, inflation rose to 260% due to expanded socialist economic
reforms. By 1973, inflation had soared to 600%.91 Ultimately, these
conditions became untenable. Similar to other countries that have
experienced severe economic misfortune, a military coup occurred,
and a junta replaced the old, democratically elected socialist gov-
ernment.92
This junta, led by General Pinochet, eliminated the elected
socialist government with the goal of extirpating the communists
out of Chile. 93 Unfortunately, like other coups or violent uprisings,
this goal was taken to its extreme.94 Ultimately, Chile's armY was
responsible for approximately 3,200 deaths or disappearances.5
By 1980, the Military began relinquishing its control, allowing
the creation of a Constitution.6 This eventually led to elections in
1981 which, unsurprisingly, led to the election of General Pinochet
for an eight-year term."'
from a $113 million surplus to a $309 million deficit).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 103 (explaining that Chile's economy was also affected by a drop in world
copper prices. However, this had a relatively slight impact when compared to the condi-
tions created by the Allende government's economic mismanagement).
92. Id. at 105-07; cf George J.W. Goodman, The German Hyperinflation,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/ess-germanhyperinflation
.html. (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Nazi Germany, for example, was created in part, due to
the economic conditions created, for the most part, from the Versailles treaty. These con-
ditions led to inflation rates that, at its worst, resulted in food prices doubling or tripling in
a matter of hours.
93. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 117.
94. Id. at 123. (explaining that the specific targets for most of these deaths and dis-
appearances were the MIR and similar communist related groups. They were progres-
sively tracked down and destroyed by the DINA, which was the secret police force of Pi-
nochet's junta. While the MIR and communist groups were potentially "legitimate"
targets for their abusive overseeing of the agrarian reforms and their terrorist-like tactics,
DINA went beyond this original mandate. Ultimately, it became powerful enough to scare
or destroy any type of opposition group and even earned senior junta members' distrust
for its ruthless tactics.).
95. Id.; See also Jen Ross, Legal Momentum Gathers in Chile Against Pinochet,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 25, 2004, at A16, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24890-2004Dec24.html (explaining that
General Pinochet is now being prosecuted in Chile for his involvement in overseeing
DINA's actions).
96. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 134.
97. Id. at 135-36.
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B. Economic Reforms Initiated by the Pinochet Regime
By 1973, Chilean inflation was over 600% and rising.9s The
government debt accounted for 25% of Chile's GDP, which was
likely to rise because the nationalized industries were losing about
$500 million a year.99 However, by Pinochet's election, GDP had
risen by 5% in three consecutive years and inflation was down to
31% .' The economic reforms that laid the groundwork for Chile's
recovery were the result of a Point IV exchange program that sent
Chilean students to U.S. universities to receive advanced de-
grees.'0 ' Many of these students went to the University of Chicago
where they studied the monetarist theory of economics validated
and made famous by Milton Friedman) °2 In 1973, the Pinochet
junta promoted these students to higher government posts so they
could administer the economy. Consequently, these economists,
known as the Chicago Boys, drastically cut government spending,
significantly dropped tariffs on foreign goods, and abolished price
controls. 1°4 For two years, the economy suffered enormous set-
backs, including substantial GDP loss, increases in unemployment,
and high inflation.' 5
While these reforms were certainly difficult for a supermajor-
ity of Chileans, they began having a positive effect by 1980, with
high growth in GDP and lower inflation.1 6 By 1981, inflation was
down to 9.1%, GDP was growing at a 5.5% clip, the fiscal deficit
had turned into a surplus, and salaries increased substantially for
consecutive years.0 7 Moreover, the policy of promoting export-
98. Id. at 135.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM
288 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that while Pinochet may have used his influence to create
conditions favorable to his election, the economic recovery he oversaw from 1973-80 likely
also contributed to his election).
101. HICKMAN,SUpra note 71, at 135-36.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 140.
105. Id. (showing that inflation was at 343% in 1975, which was half of what it was in
1973. Also, GDP fell by 13% and unemployment dropped from 1974 levels. However, the
reforms instituted by the Chicago Boys predicted such results from their policies, their
thinking being that there would be no lasting, long term gain without some massive short
term pain.); see also LOVEMAN, supra note 100, at 269.
106. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 145.
107. Id. (defining real rise in salary as gross salary increase adjusted for inflationary
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driven growth was beginning to produce impressive results.' °8
Natural resources, such as fruit, timber, and fishing products, were
increasingly produced and exported, diversifying Chile's economy
and reducing the country's reliance on its mining industries.10 9 With
increased prosperity, profits and benefits began to "trickle down,"
both in wages and in social welfare, as the policy focus shifted to
other social policies including labor law development, education,
and justice." These social reforms ultimately outlived the Pinochet
government and have served as models for many other Latin
American countries.11
C. The Fall of Free Markets and the Demise of Pinochet
In 1982, oil prices skyrocketed and triggered a massive reces-
sion, along with wild investment speculation, causing Chile's GDP
to fall by over 14%.112 This crash resulted in decreased standards of
living and outbursts of street protests by many people in the lower
and middle classes."' By 1984, Chile's free market model was be-
ing reassessed due to the positive influence high tariffs and export
incentives, which were implemented in response to the recession
114of 1982, had on mild reflation. In spite of this positive influence,
most of the free market policies instituted in the late 1970s were
slowly reinstituted because many feared a return to the prior so-
cialist system."'
At this time, the Pinochet government was fielding harsh
criticism. Because of his regime's violent and autocratic tactics and
Chile's lack of progress toward democracy, U.S. policy turned
against Pinochet in 1984.116 In 1988, Chile held a plebiscite to de-
termine if Pinochet and the Chilean military would reign for an-
other eight years or whether Chile would implement democraticelectons.117 . • 118
elections. 11' Pinochet lost by nine percentage points.
affects).
108. Id. at 145.
109. Id. (Chile has about 20% of the world's copper supply).
110. Id. at 148-49.
111. Id. at 149.
112. LOVEMAN, supra note 100, at 281.
113. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 181.
114. Id. at 184.
115. Id. at 184-85.
116. Id. at 186.
117. Id. at 199.
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After elections were held in 1989, elected president Patricio
Aylwin agreed with the opposition parties to accept a free market
economic system along the same lines of the economic policy es-
tablished during the military regime."9 By the end of the 1980s,
Chile's average per capita income was about $2,000.120 The 1990s
saw Chilean economic policies of encouraging free markets result
in high GDP growth and decreased unemployment. 2' Six years af-
ter free elections, Chile's average per capita income rose by 137%
to $4,740.122 Moreover, Chile instituted government programs to
enhance the "trickle down" effect of this economic growth, de-
creasing the proportion of Chileans living in poverty from 40% to
24% by 1996.123 Chile's policies have been wildly successful, result-
ing in its per capita income increasing 89% from $4,740 in 1996, to
$8, 960 in 2002.
As a result of these economic reforms, Chile's economy has
grown and its citizens have achieved the 1 6 h highest GDP growth
125rate in the world. Moreover, despite its chaotic past, which in-
volved a coup and resulting junta that caused fifteen years of
highly volatile and oftentimes repressive policies, Chile has been
the only Latin American country to achieve growth in a steady,
stable manner, while diversifying its economy by expanding its
manufacturing base. 26
118. Id. at 199. These plebiscites, as required by the 1980 Constitution and developed
after the military replaced the corrupt socialist leaders of 1972, were to be held every eight
years until the military (Pinochet) lost. After the military lost, democratic elections were
to be implemented. Pinochet had the support of the Vice Commander-in-Chief of the
Chilean Army to ignore the election result. However, Pinochet refused this opportunity,
claiming he had sworn to uphold the 1980 Constitution and would abide by the results.
Thus, the military's control ended after 15 years. Id. at 200-202.
119. Id. at 205-07.
120. Id. at 206.
121. Id. at 212 (showing that in 1988, per capita income was $1,890, inflation was
14.7%, and unemployment was 8.3%. By 1995, inflation was 8.2% and unemployment was
5.5%. Additionally, GDP had risen almost 150% to $4,740.).
122. Id.
123. Id. at213.
124. See NationMaster.com, Map & Graph: Economy: GDP (PPP) (per capita) (Top
50 Countries), http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco-gdp-ppp-cap# (last visited Feb.
21, 2005).
125. See NationMaster.com, Chile Economy, http://www.nationmaster.com/country/
ci/Economy&bdefine=l (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
126. World Bank, Economy, at 3 (2002), http://www.worldbank.org/
data/wdi2002/economy.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); see also Export Council for Energy
Efficiency, Market Assessment of Chile, (1999), http://www.ecee.org/pubs/assess/
[Vol. 28:129
Intellectual Property Rights
Even though Chile has a large portion of its population still
living in poverty, there is little support for government interven-
tion to redistribute the rewards of its economic growth. 2 7 Instead,
Chilean policies are focused on increasing economic efficiency, ex-
panding access to markets, and exploiting all of Chile's compara-
tive advantages to create the wealth needed to provide for greater
overall prosperity. As a result, in the last decade, Chile has been
at the forefront of FTA negotiations to implement its economic
policies.
D. Chile's International Policies and Negotiations
Since the early 1990's Chile has pursued its trade objectives
through a multidimensional trade policy.129 This involved consoli-
dating its unilateral policy of openness as well as negotiating new
bilateral free trade agreements, fine-tuning existing agreements,
and actively Rarticipating in regional and multilateral forums and
negotiations.
Having suffered from intermittent boycotts by the U.S. and a
general reluctance by Western countries to maintain more than
formal relationships with Chile throughout the Pinochet regime,
Chile has been interested in ensuring uninterrupted trade relation-
ships."' In the late 1980s, Chile began negotiations to enter into
132various new regional and inter-American agreements. In 1990,
President Bush stated that Chile would be the U.S.'s first choice
for inclusion in NAFTA."3 However, in spite of this policy an-
nouncement and numerous promises from various U.S. delega-
tions that included visits from various U.S. senators, the U.S. failed
to incorporate Chile into NAFTA or negotiate a bilateral agree-
114ment similar to NAFTA for fourteen years.
Chile's international focus is not limited to the U.S. market
because Chile's foreign trade is relatively evenly distributed be-
Chile/Chile.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (citing Chapter/Section 1 entitled, "Chile's
Economy and Investment Conditions").
127. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 225.
128. Id.
129. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7.
130. Id. at 7-8.
131. HICKMAN, Supra note 71, at 215.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 216.
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tween the U.S., Latin America, the European Union, and Asia.135
Thus, Chile expanded its search for other free trade or reduced
tariff agreements with various trading partners."' For example,
Chile entered into bilateral FTAs with Mexico in 1991, Venezuela
and Colombia in 1993, and Ecuador in 1994.37 Moreover, while
negotiating these bilateral trade agreements, Chile was also in-
volved in various multilateral negotiations, many of which came to
fruition by the mid-1990's. 138 In 1996, Chile became a formal asso-
ciate member to Mercosur, a free trade agreement between Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.139 Chile also joined the Asian
Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC") agreement and entered
into an association agreement with the European Union. During
these negotiations, Chile was actively involved with the WTO, with
the primary focus on promoting further reaching multilateral trade
agreements. 4'
From 1998 to 2002, Chile was able to negotiate more FTAs,
making pacts with South Korea, Canada, and various Central
American countries. 42 Moreover, Chile moved beyond its associa-
tion agreement by entering into a full FTA with the European Un-
ion.143 As a result, goods from Chile's new trade partners replaced
American goods in the Chilean market.'" As Chileans substituted
cheaper European goods for American goods, the U.S. went from
having a slight trade surplus with Chile to running a trade deficit.
145
After two years of decreasing sales, the U.S. reasserted its desire
to negotiate an FTA.4 6 While the Americans had been slow to act
135. Id. at 216-17.
136. Id. at 217.
137. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Chile 1997,
Sept. 10, 1997, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trp-e/tp60_e.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2005).
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Lindsay M. Faine, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Impli-
cations of the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383,
390-91 (2004); Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 9.
143. Id.
144. Faine, supra note 142, at 399, 401.
145. Id. at 401.
146. Id.; see also Aaron Schavey, How Trade Promotion Authority Would Bolster the
Manufacturing Industry, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, (June 21, 2002),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1561.cfm.
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under the Bush and Clinton administrations of the 1990s, the eco-
nomic losses it experienced provided the necessary motivation and
urgency for Chile to negotiate an FTA it had coveted for over ten
years.
Chile's history of economic and political development pro-
vides a basis for analyzing which of these theories best explains
Chile's decision to enter into a bilateral FTA with the U.S.
IV. AUSTRALIA
Australia is the only developed country, other than Canada,
to agree to some type of FTA with the United States, and is the
only one to do so in a bilateral forum."" Australia also provides a
good comparison with Chile because both countries' main exports
to the U.S. are minerals (e.g., gold, iron ore, and coal) and agricul-
tural goods (e.g., wool, wheat, and beef).149 Australia, however, has
been more politically stable and has a more developed economy,
with services and manufacturing making up larger parts of its
150
economy.
Based on the various theories presented by commentators,
one would expect Australia's bilateral FTA with the U.S. to have
resulted from one of these scenarios: (1) The U.S. coercing Austra-
lia into the FTA by its "hegemonic" power;"' (2) Australia at-
tempting to further its economic policy by negotiating away IPRs
for greater access to the U.S. market;'52 or (3) Massive multina-
tional corporations lobbying to further their own economic inter-
ests. 53
In order to appreciate and understand the potential motiva-
147. Id.; HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 216-17.
148. See USTR-Bilateral Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgrements/Bilateral/SectionIndex.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
149. American Australian Association, Australia Fact Sheet, at 1,
http://www.americanaustralian.org/Corporate/pdflaustraliafactsheet.pdf (last visited Feb.
21, 2005).
150. Compare WORLD FACTBOOK AUSTRALIA, supra note 73 (looking at Australia's
more sophisticated and advanced main exports and imports including machinery and
transport equipment, computers and office machines, telecommunication equipment, and
parts), with WORLD FACTBOOK CHILE, supra note 76 (looking at Chile's less sophisti-
cated exports and imports commodities including consumer goods, chemicals, motor vehi-
cles, fuels, electrical machinery, heavy industrial machinery, and food).
151. See Okediji, supra note 78, at 133.
152. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 8.
153. Drahos, supra note 5, at 20-21; see also Marsden, supra note 80, at 400-04.
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tions and objectives that may have been implicated in entering into
an FTA with the U.S, a brief background of Australia's economy
and recent history is necessary.
A. Traditionally Stable First World Economy
Traditionally, Australia's economy was dependent on natural
resources, specifically wool and gold, to achieve its political and
economic success. In the 1890's, Australia was a moderately pro-
tectionist country, with Free Traders and Protectionists compro-
mising to achieve efficient production and redistribution policies.'
Protectionists in Australia thought that tariff increases could in-
crease employment and redistribute income to the less wealthy.156
However, as the mining industry became a large portion of Austra-
lia's income and a major source of its exports, this attitude became
less popular.'57
Australia's system of protection relied heavily on administra-
tively allocated quotas that were designed to protect items of mass
consumption like textiles, footwear, and clothing.' This policy,
however, closed off opportunities for the expansion of Australia's
more productive industries. 9 For example, productive industries
that benefited most from these quotas (textiles, clothing, and
footwear) experienced steep declines in domestic consumption
during the 1970s.160 By contrast, less protected industries, such as
the automobile manufacturing industry, grew at a much larger rate
than textiles, even though the textile industry was disproportion-
ately favored by tariffs.16 Additionally, industries protected by
quotas experienced large declines in employment.'62 Thus, in spite
of the fact that protectionist measures redistributed income to the
protected industries in a larger proportion, it yielded no improved
154. ROSS GARNAUT, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA'S ASIAN FUTURE 131
(Matthew May ed., Asia Pacific Press 2001).
155. Id. at 44.
156. Id. at 45.
157. Id.
158. Id. The quotas were not like tariffs because they affected only selected income.
Accordingly, the quotas essentially acted as a government subsidy to certain groups at the
expense of other groups.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 41.
161. Id. at 132.
162. Id. at 41.
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result.1 63 Moreover, the government subsidy was used to artificially
enhance goods that disproportionately and detrimentally affected
poor Australians' purchasing power because these measures were
applied to necessities, such as clothing and footwear.' 64
As it became more apparent that Australia's protectionist
measures and system were flawed, disproportionately affecting the
economic well-being of the poor, Australia began to rethink its
economic and trade policies. 16 As a result, Australia began liberal-
izing its trade policies in the early 1980's.166 Australia raised its in-
ternational competitiveness of all production of tradeable goods
and decreased its reliance on wool and mineral exports.67 While
wool and mineral exports increased, manufacturing and services
expanded even more.16 Nonetheless, wool and mining industries
still represent the bulk of Australian exports.169
The net effect of Australia's trade liberalization policy is that
it suddenly made Australia a credible participant in bilateral, re-
gional, and multilateral negotiations in textile trade, greatly affect-. • •170
ing its large wool industry. Thus, one of Australia's primary ob-
jectives was to advance textile trade liberalization in order to
further increase its market access to the global wool and textile
markets.17" '
B. International Economic Policies
Australia's trade liberalization has a large impact on its policy
outlook. Australia is committed to achieving free and open trade
with all the developed Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation coun-
163. Id.
164. Id. at 41, 46.
165. Id. at 46.
166. Id. at 132; see also Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Re-
view: Australia 2002, Sept. 25, 2002, available at http://wto.org/english/tra-
top-e/tpr-e/tp202_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that tariff reduction from
1970-2001 has seen a drop from 34.9% to 4.8% for manufacturing and 28% to 6% drop for
agriculture. Australia also continues to disproportionately favor clothing and footwear
sectors, but has dropped this support significantly, and plans to continue decreasing the
disproportionate favoring.).
167. GARNAUT,supra note 154, at 131.
168. Id. at 132 & 134.
169. Id. at 139.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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tries by 2010, and the less developed ones by 2020.72 Specifically,
Australia is focused on investment liberalization and expanding
and encouraging business cooperation."' Additionally, Australia
has sought to strengthen IPRs, but not copyright related IPRs. 74
Australia also has signed an FTA with New Zealand and, in
addition to its objectives within APEC, is looking to expand FTAs
with other regional associations, particularly The Association of
South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN"). 5
C. Decision to Enter Into an FTA With the U.S.
Australia also recently entered into an FTA with the U.S.
Unlike Chile, there was extensive internal debate as to whether
entering into this FTA was in its best interests. The proponents of
entering into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. cited various reasons,
some of which were similar to Chile's.176 For example, Australia
wanted to increase its access to U.S. markets, better facilitate
American foreign investment, and enhance protections for its
American investments.' Unlike Chile, which lacks significant anti-
globalization organizations or political parties, Australia has po-
172. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Australia 2002,
supra note 166. This is significant because APEC represents about 50% of global trade.
173. Id.
174. Id. While Australia accepted TRIPS, it has not attempted to strengthen or ex-
pand IPRs in the biotech/pharmaceutical industry that would negatively affect its Pharma-
ceutical Benefits Scheme. For example, Australia was not willing to ratify the WIPO
Copyright and WIPO Performances and Phonograms treaties until signing an FTA with
the U.S. (The U.S. implementation of these WIPO treaties was the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)). See Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement, supra note 4.
175. AUSTL. CHAMBER OF COM. AND INDUSTRY, ASEAN-AUSTRALIA / NEW
ZEALAND FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WORTH PURSUING 1, (Aug. 20, 2004),
http://www.acci.asn.au/text files/issues-papers/Trade/ASEAN-Aust-NZ%20_August
%202004_.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
176. Compare AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media - General Issues,
http://www.austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefsl.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
General Issues] with Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7.
177. See Alan Oxley, Report on the New Year, THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW (Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.austa.net/publicForum/publicForum4.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005); AUSTA, Increasing Investment Too, FTA ANALYST, Sept. 5,
2003, http://www.austa.net/analyst/analyst16.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (stating 42%
of Australia's foreign investment was distributed to the United States); see also DAVID
RICHARDSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE AUSTL. U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
5 (Mar. 8, 2004), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubscibl2003-04/04cibO7.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005) (showing that U.S. foreign investment represented 33 percent of the total
value of foreign investment in 2002-03).
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litical parties that are anti-globalization or anti-United States.78
Moreover, Australia has influential commentators that are against
bilateral agreements due to their feared negative impact on form-ing ultiaterl .179
ing multilateral agreements. However, the political parties op-
posing an FTA with the U.S. made up only about ten percent of
Australia's electorate.
180
While there was more public debate in Australia than in
Chile, the supermajority of its electorate appear to have come to a
similar conclusion: even if it had to strengthen IPRs, an FTA with
the U.S. was in its best interest.'8'
Australia's economic development and history over the past
few decades should provide some insight into determining which
of the hypotheses best explains Australia's decision to enter into a
bilateral FTA with the U.S. These hypotheses are more exten-
sively assessed below.
178. Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement, supra note 4.
179. Id. See generally, THE AUSTRALIAN INTEREST, http://www.australianinter-
est.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (various websites and links and articles provided on the
FTA with the U.S.). But see BUSINESS COUNCIL OF AUSTL, OPINION PIECE IN
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW: FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. (Feb. 10,
2004), http://www.bca.com.au/content.asp?newslD=94430 (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). It is
rather surprising that groups against an FTA argue that Australian business will suffer
considering business groups are generally very optimistic about the FTA and the new
prospects it may create. Moreover, Australia's government even thinks its trade liberaliza-
tion policies are a major reason for its economic success of the past ten to fifteen years. It
is possible, however, that some Australians may be negatively impacted in ways that may
not affect businesses. For example, it is claimed by some sources that drug prices will go
up as a result of this FTA. See Media Release, Public Health Association of Australia,
Howard Government Plays Mean and Tricky on the PBS in The Australia/US Free Trade
Agreement (March 4, 2004), http://www.phaa.net.au/AdvocacyIssues/howardgovfta.htm.
Thus, while an FTA may have a net positive impact on business, it could have a net nega-
tive impact on individuals or possibly just health related sectors of Australian soci-
ety/business (assuming prices do go up as a result of the FTA). Regardless, it seems that
most of these claims of a net negative economic impact are likely over exaggerated be-
cause both a vast major of political parties and business leaders promoted the FTA. See
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP., AUSTRALIA VOTES: FEDERAL ELECTION 2004,
http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2004/results (last visited Nov. 28, 2004); General
Issues, supra note 176.
180. AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP., AUSTRALIA VOTES: FEDERAL
ELECTION 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2004/results (last visited Nov. 28,
2004). Both the Labor (leading minority party) and Liberal (Prime Minister Howard's
party) parties in Australia were for the FTA with the U.S. While people vote on numerous
issues, this supermajority illustrates, at the least, that an FTA with the United States was a
minor issue for most voters in this election.
181. Cf. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7.
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This part of the paper will analyze the results discovered in
parts III and IV to assess each country's experience through the
lens of each generalized theory: U.S. hegemony, multinational
corporate lobbying, and autonomous policy implementation. Ad-
ditionally, this section will project these findings onto other areas
of discourse. Specifically, it will discuss the ramifications these re-
sults may have on determining whether a bilateral or multilateral
forum is more equitable for less developed countries negotiating
with developed countries and whether NGOs should be involved
in IPR-related negotiations.
A. Chile
Chile obviously was not coerced into an FTA with the United
States. Instead, Chile had to negotiate for over a decade and first
enter into an FTA with the EU before the United States would
agree to meaningful negotiations. 182 In fact, were it not for the loss
of market share that U.S. goods experienced as a result of Chile's
previously made agreement, it is possible that the U.S. would have
continued to shun Chile, especially when considering the potential
political ramifications that the agreement could have caused in the
2004 elections.18 Thus, Chile's negotiating tactics reveal an experi-
ence or sophistication that enables Chile to balance the interests of
various partners, while also negotiating with various other parties.
Chile was not just negotiating with the U.S during this time. It was
and is also involved in numerous other organizations and bilateral
agreements, ranging from APEC to bilateral talks with various
other countries, including South Korea, Canada, and other Latin
American countries.'9 Consequently, it appears the U.S. was co-
erced into an agreement with Chile by Chile's successful negotia-
tion of an FTA with the EU, which arose, in part, because the EU
knew its goods could become more competitive with American
goods by agreeing to such an FTA.'85
Thus, it appears that both developed and less developed
182. See discussion supra Part III.D.
183. Cf Paul Blustein, Central American Agreement Could Have Been Big Campaign
Issue, WASHINGTON POST, May 28,2004, at E4.
184. See Faine, supra note 142, at 390.
185. See id. at 401; see also Schavey, supra note 146.
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countries have various tactics and powers available to them in bi-
lateral negotiations that are not inherently unfair or biased. In fact,
this case study suggests that less developed countries are just as
capable and sophisticated negotiators as developed countries. Spe-
cifically, Chile's decision to engage in bilateral negotiations pro-
vided it the necessary freedom to make an agreement with the
U.S. A multilateral setting would not have allowed Chile to play
the U.S. against other large interest groups like the EU, because
the EU and the U.S. would have been much more likely to be
aligned against a less developed country like Chile. 86 Moreover,
because Chile has been a stable government for only about fifteen
years, it is not necessarily true that a significantly long time period
is required to develop negotiation expertise.187
Chile, as a democracy, represents the will of the majority of
its citizens in negotiating FTAs and other international agree-
ments. Because it views its trade liberalization policy as the main
reason for its quintupled per capita income over the last fifteen
years, its decision to continue to further this policy goal is unlikely
due to outside coercion.'88 Instead, it appears to reflect the appar-
ent success its policies have had and its population's desire to con-
tinue to expand these policies. Specifically, agreeing to increased
IPRs in order to expand its competitiveness and market access to
core economic interest groups is a well-reasoned and politically
justifiable action.189 Moreover, as history has indicated, it appears
to be working and will provide the opportunity for Chile to in-
creasingly develop a manufacturing base and educational institu-
tion expertise.' 90 It takes excess money to create improved institu-
tions of education, which provide educated work forces capable of
more technologically sophisticated production of goods related to
186. Okediji, supra note 5, at 850.
187. Mehdi Shafaeddin, United Nations Conference on Trade and Developmet, Ge-
neva Switz., Dec. 1998, How Did Developed Countries Industrialize? The History of Trade
and Industrial Policy: The Cases of Great Britain and the USA, 11, http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_139.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that very
fast and timely policy implementation may be necessary for a less developed country to
have any success at effectively implementing their economic policy goals).
188. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7.
189. See Id.
190. See WORLD FACTBOOK CHILE, supra note 76 (economy overview section) and
EUR. TRADE COMMISSION, BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS-CHILE, (Oct. 2002),
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/chile/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
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pharmaceuticals, software, or electronics.'91 Furthermore, Chilean
dependence on American foreign investment and its desire to in-
crease or at least maintain this same level of investment is directly
benefited from increasing various measures. 92 Thus, Chile appears
to have given up very little in order to gain greater access to one
fifth of the world's economic marketplace.
1. Testing Hypotheses
i. U.S. hegemony
Based on the long period of time it took the U.S. to enter into
a bilateral FTA with Chile, it appears unlikely that the FTA re-
sulted from any direct application of American hegemonic power.
Because the U.S. only entered into meaningful negotiations after
Chile successfully negotiated an agreement with the EU, it seems
that Chile used different negotiating tactics in order to facilitate an
FTA with the U.S, which had been one of its major policy goals
since 1990.19'
In fact, Chile has engaged in various forums to further its
trade liberalization policies. From entering Mercorsur, to bilateral
FTAs with the EU, Mexico, Canada, and other countries, to enter-
ing APEC, it is unlikely that these activities can be truly attributed
to U.S. hegemonic power or influence. Instead, it seems Chile ac-
tively seeks to implement its policies by promoting agreements and
effectuating occurrences it believes will increase its citizens' well
being. 94 At the very least, it does not appear that the Chilean gov-
ernment felt coerced into the bilateral agreement."' As the Chil-
ean government wrote in its most recent WTO report:
[The] Free Trade Agreement [with the U.S.] shows that a de-
veloping country can reach a mutually satisfactory and compre-
hensive agreement with a developed country, an agreement
which does not merely focus on market access, but also attaches
191. Shafaeddin, supra note 187, at 6 and cf BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST 176-77 (explaining that economic growth is necessary to support the
costs of environmental protection).
192. See Evgenia V. Sorokina, Chile's Free Trade Agreements: Can Their Benefits
Survive Chile's Continuing Controls on Foreign Capital?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1217,
1218 (2003).
193. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 216.
194. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7.
195. Id. at 9-10.
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importance to institutional matters that contribute to transpar-
ency and improved conditions of competition which, over time,
will benefit all countries that trade with Chile. 96
In view of the Chilean government's understanding of its
FTA negotiations with the U.S. and the economic occurrences un-
derlying the American negotiation and agreement to the FTA, it
does not appear that American hegemony or coercion played any
role in the negotiations.1 97
ii. Multinational Corporate Lobbying
The Multinational Corporate Lobbying theory appears to
have more applicability than American hegemony. After all, the
Americans were not actively interested in negotiating an FTA with
Chile until after Chile had an FTA with the EU, which negatively
affected American trade.198 While corporate lobbying over the
FTA likely occurred in both countries, it does not appear that
there was any concerted effort to lobby or present some type of
"false hope" or misleading claim to either government. Instead, it
seems that the interested and affected corporations and other par-
ties of each respective country lobbied to further their inapposite
corporate interests.
The one "hope," or effective lobbying that could be attribut-
able to some multinational or large American corporation(s) is the
FTA's provision requiring capital market reforms to create in-
creased foreign investment in Chile. 99 However, this appears to
have been something Chile recognized and attempted to address
using a variety of policies.'0 Moreover, the increased liberalization
of Chile's capital market and the increased market access gained
through the FTA actually support its policy of growing exports.2
1
It does not appear that Chile agreed to this provision as a result of
effective lobbying of some multinational corporation because me-
dium sized Chilean corporations were greatly affected by Chile's
196. Id. at 9.
197. See also Carranza, supra note 8, at 1064 ("T]he Southern Cone countries are
now makers and not simply takers of international policy .....
198. Schavey, supra note 146.
199. See Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7.
200. Sorokina, supra note 192, at 1228-29.
201. Id.
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current capital market regulatory structure. 20 Consequently, lob-
bying from affected corporate interests within its constituency
seems to be the most likely influence on Chile's acceptance of this
provision, which is more akin to typical politics than geopolitical
objectives driven by large corporate interests.
iii. Chile's Autonomous Policy Implementation
The most likely explanation for Chile's decision to enter into
a bilateral FTA with the U.S. was to further its own interests. In
light of Chile's struggles in the 1970s and 1980s, and its belief that
its free market and trade liberalization policies have been a major
reason for its recent economic success, its desire to enter into a
trade liberalization agreement with the U.S. is consistent with this
policy.2 3 In fact, it furthers this policy.2°4
One can argue that Chile's economic policies are wrong or
improperly developed, but Chile has found stability and success
205compared to other countries, especially in the past fifteen years.
Moreover, these economic policies are strongly supported by the
country's populace. °6
In fact, Chile's decision to enter into a bilateral FTA with the
U.S. without seeking to diminish American agricultural subsidies,
(a problem that greatly affects Chileans' large farming industry),
may be a strategic negotiating decision. Currently, the FTAA has
become bogged down due to an impasse over American agricul-• 207
tural subsidies, the strengthening of IPRs, and other issues. Con-
sequently, this FTA may be a decision by Chile to make more im-
mediate and certain gains in the American market. ° Thus, Chile is
able to continue to address problems associated with American
subsidies in the FTAA forum, in which it may have greater success
due to the presence of Brazil and other Mercorsur countries, which
are largely responsible for the FTAA negotiation impasse.209 As
202. Id. ("[T]he brunt of protection against capitales golondrina is borne by Chilean
companies, and in particular, by medium size companies that cannot raise cheaper capital
to finance their operations and expansion.").
203. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 79, at 7-8.
204. See Sorokina, supra note 192, at 1218.
205. STIGLITZ, supra note 28, at 18.
206. HICKMAN, supra note 71, at 224-25.
207. Carranza, supra note 8, 1051-52.
208. See discussion supra Parts III.C-D.
209. Carranza, supra note 8, at 1062 ("[T]he United States had threatened to build
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these issues specifically relate to IPRs and agrarian subsidies, it is
Brazil and Argentina that have the most to lose in granting
stronger IPRs since both countries have relatively large pharma-
ceutical and agricultural industries.1 ° In contrast, Chile has no sub-
stantial industries relying on IPRs and is not overly concerned with
American farm subsidies, either because it is secretly hoping for
Brazil's success in FTAA negotiations or because it is not con-
cerned with the long-term effects of subsidies on Chilean prod-
ucts.2 '
Consequently, it appears that Chile entered a bilateral FTA
with the U.S. to further its own trade policies. Moreover, Chile ap-
pears little concerned with potential problems that stronger IPRs
may present to its economic or technological development.22 This
is due to Chile's economy having no substantial industries that rely
on IPRs, like the pharmaceutical industry. Another explanation is
that Chile hopes the FTA will increase the rate of transfer and dis-
semination of various technologies, which would either offset or be
a net benefit when compared to any negative implications associ-
the FTAA with or without Brazil, but it soon became apparent that without Brazil there
would be no real FTAA."). Of course, in the FTAA negotiations, Chile has taken a more
pro-American stance as compared to the other Latin American countries. See generally id.
This could be due to the above mentioned strategy of relying on Brazil to further Chile's
policy hopes without preventing Chile from obtaining a further delayed bilateral FIA with
the U.S, or it could be due to Chile being less concerned with U.S. subsidies than its com-
patriots or being more influenced by American economic power. Since Chile is already an
associate member of Mercorsur, it appears Chile is essentially on both sides of the negoti-
ating table, receiving a net positive outcome regardless of the FTAA negotiations (i.e.
wins if Mercorsur gains concessions from U.S., but doesn't face the prospect of losing
greater access to American markets if the FrAA falls apart or is greatly delayed due to its
current FTA). Id. at 1043-47.
210. See Marta Beckerman, Static and Dynamic Impacts of Mercorsur: The Case of
the Pharmaceutical Sector, 75 CEPAL REV. 217, 220-22 (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/ousg/articles/pdf/lcg2l5Oi-Bekerman.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2005); Alan F. Holmer, The Pharmaceutical Industry View, 18 MULTINATIONAL MONI-
TOR 4, April 1997, available at http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/
hper/mm0497.14.html; see also Carranza, supra note 8, at 1062.
211. See SIMEON TEGEL, CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, U.C. BERKELEY
THE WTO CoTrON CASE: A FAIR TRADE WATERSHED? (2004), http://
www.clas.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/fa1I2004/10-04-04-sumner (last visited Feb. 21, 2005);
cf Heifer, supra note 6, at 55, 61. Chile may feel American subsidies are more properly
limited through regime change in the WTO or through the FTAA negotiation process.
212. Maria Julia Olivia, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and
Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 45, 54 (2003) ("Intellectual property systems de-
signed for highly industrialized countries may actually hinder innovation relevant to de-
veloping countries.").
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ated with granting stronger IPRs."3 Since Chile relies on exports to
fill most of its manufacturing and technological needs, it is likely
that technological transfer increases will increase its citizens' well
being without many negative affects to its industrial interests.1
B. Australia
As compared to Chile's fifteen year FTA negotiation process,
the U.S. was much more willing to negotiate with Australia. This is
surprising in light of many commentators' claims that developed
countries are less willing to be coerced by the U.S. Allegedly, this
attitude is why the U.S. does not entertain bilateral talks with
many developed countries, specifically the EU.215 In contrast, it
took a relatively short time to make a similar pact with Australia.
This may be due to Australia having more accessible and experi-
enced negotiators when talks were initiated. Alternatively, it may
be due to artificial or inherent prejudices that American policy has
against countries that do not share its Anglican heritage and lan-
guage. However, as with Canada (albeit to a lesser extent), Austra-
lia is dependent upon the American market for a large amount of
its agriculture and gold mining exports.216 Since these two indus-
tries are large, they had a great impact on the political decision to
acquiesce to an FTA providing greater PRS. Moreover, such an
agreement is consistent with recent Australian policies, which have
focused on expanding its IPRs over the last few years.28 This is
probably particularly true when considering Australia's small en-
219tertainment and software industries. Moreover, because Austra-
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Cf. Wadley, supra note 58, at 578-80.
216. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 72 (explaining that mining and agricul-
tural products, while respectively making up 4.6 % and 2.8% of Australia's GDP, are its
principal exports).
217. See AUSTA, Latest Developments, http://www.austa.net/index.php (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Latest Developments]; Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note
72.
218. Trade Access: Negotiating for Better Market Access, AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY
GROUP, Feb. 7, 2004, 2, http://www.austa.net/pdf/AIGfeb04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
219. ALLEN CONSULTING GROUP, THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF
AUSTRALIA'S COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES ii-iii (2001), available at
http://www.copyright.com.au/reports%20&%20papers/(c)-Value.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
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lia has increasingly expanded its manufacturing industries over the
past ten to fifteen years, the increased market access provides an
avenue to create accelerated growth.2 20 Likewise, as with Chile,
Australia relies heavily on American foreign investment and Aus-
tralia had much to gain and little to lose in agreeing to expand
IPRs for greater foreign investment access. 21
Australia was also concerned that less developed countries
were becoming more competitive and gaining greater access to
American markets as a direct result of their FTAs with the U.S.
2 2
Thus, the less developed countries may be greatly impacting de-
veloped countries' decisions in making bilateral agreements, at
least in the case with Australia. 23
More importantly, as with Chile, Australia considers its trade
liberalization policies of the last ten to fifteen years as being a ma-
jor reason for its success in expanding its economy and growing its
manufacturing and other industries.2' Thus, Australia's agreement
also reflects its population's decision to continue implementing a
policy that has been credited with greatly increasing its financial
well-being. Moreover, for most Australians, greater IPRs are likely
to provide a negligible problem when compared to the positive
225impacts of the FTA and stronger IPRs on Australia's industries.
220. Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, supra note 218, at 2.
221. Compare Bruce Rasmussen, An Analysis of the Biomedical Sectors in Australia
and Canada in a National Innovation Systems Context 7 (Ctr. for Strategic Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 21, 2004), available at http://www.cfses.com/documents/pharma/21-
BiomedicalSectAust_&_CanInnovationRasmussen.pdf, with ALLEN CONSULTING
GROUP, supra note 219, at ii-iii.
222. See General Issues, supra note 176; AUSTA, Public Forum,
http://www.austa.net/publicForum/publicForum20.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Public Forum].
223. See AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media - International Economic Issues,
http://www.austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefs2.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
International Economic Issues].
224. See THE AUSTL. APEC STUDY CTR., AN AUSTRALIA-USA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 49 (Monash University) (Aug. 2001), available
at http://www.austa.net/pdf/chapter5.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2005).
225. See Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement, supra note 4. This could change if
IPRs negatively impact Australia's pharmaceutical entitlement program, but this is not
expected to occur.
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1. Testing Hypotheses
i. U.S. Hegemony
U.S. negotiations with Australia appear to have progressed
relatively smoothly. While Australia was willing to agree to
stronger IPRs, it also gained the greater access to U.S. markets.... 226
and foreign investment it desired. In lieu of the fact that Austra-
lia has relatively small IPR-oriented industries, it appears Austra-
lia sacrificed very little to achieve its objectives. 2
In agreeing to an FTA with the U.S., it seems Australia was
reacting to various factors.2 ' The largest factor was the increased
competition in American agricultural markets resulting from the
FTAs the U.S. made or was planning to make with various Latin
and Central American countries.229 Other factors included Austra-
lia's concern for recent anti-free trade actions, like the tariffs
placed on American steel imports originating from countries with
whom the U.S. had no FTAs, and Australia's desire to further its.. .. . 230
trade liberalization policies.
Thus, it seems there could be some support for a U.S. coer-
cion hypothesis in relation to Australia because of American anti-
free trade tariffs and subsidies. However, the steel tariff was only
transitory in nature and repealed after a WTO ruling invalidated
the tariff fifteen months after it was created.23' Moreover, Australia
was able to exempt its largest steel exporter, BHP Steel, from most
of these tariffs.232 While U.S. tariffs and subsidies may have been
an Australian concern, there were already avenues in place to deal
with this issue. Therefore, this cannot adequately explain Austra-
lia's desire for an FTA.
226. See Public Forum, supra note 222; see also discussion supra Parts IV.C.
227. This could prove to be inaccurate if this FTA impedes Australia's drug program.
Australia, however, would not have knowingly negotiated IPR protection away. See Issues
Likely to Arise in an Agreement, supra note 4.
228. See International Economic Issues, supra note 223.
229. See id.; General Issues, supra note 176.
230. Id.; Public Forum, supra note 222.
231. U.S. Steel Tariffs Officially Ruled Illegal, THE AUTOBEAT DAILY, July 14, 2003,
at 1, http://www.autobeatdaily.com/pdfs/07-14-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
232. The Australia United States Free Trade Agreement Business Group, Can Aus-
tralia Negotiate with the US?, FTA ANALYST (Issue No. 5), Mar. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.austa.net/analyst/analyst5.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Can
Australia Negotiate with the US?].
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Moreover, Australia felt it had adequate negotiating power.
233
This is validated because business and political leaders generally
231
seem happy with the ErA.2 Consequently, it does not appear that
Australia was coerced into making this agreement. Instead, Aus-
tralia appears to have been interested in making the agreement to
further its own interests while increasing or maintaining American
attention in the Pacific region. 5
ii. Multinational Corporate Lobbying
The multinational corporate lobbying theory appears to have
much more applicability to the Australian-U.S. FTA than it did for
the Chilean-U.S. FIA. Some of the major proponents of the Aus-
tralia-U.S. FTA were Alcoa, Kellogg, Caterpillar, IBM, and Mo-
bil. 36 Moreover, the mining, metals, and manufacturing industries
are expected to make the largest gains from the FTA. ' These re-
sults would clearly help Alcoa and Caterpillar.
Additionally, the FTA signed by Australia and the U.S. ap-
pears to help a vast array of Australian business, especially agricul-
tural interests, and its automotive industry.238 Consequently, it ap-
pears that Australia attempted to help all of its industries in
making the FTA, not just large multinational corporations. The
U.S. was also more willing to make concessions that could help
companies that have a substantial business presence in the U.S.
due to effective lobbying.239 However, the magnitude of this effect
remains unclear. Moreover, the fact that this agreement increased
Australian financial investment into the U.S., and will also help
233. See General Issues, supra note 176; Can Australia Negotiate with the US?, supra
note 232.
234. See Latest Developments, supra note 217. One major exception would be Aus-
tralia's failure to obtain greater access to the U.S. sugar market. Id. However, some com-
mentators believe it is best to deal with this issue in the .WTO. General Issues, supra note
176. Moreover, numerous commentators use Canada as an example to indicate that Aus-
tralia will still greatly gain from the FTA, in spite of this failure. See e.g., Tony Parkinson,
Why We Have Lots To Gain From The FTA, (July 3, 2004),
http://www.theage.com.au/articies/2004/07/02/1088488151256.html?from=storylhs&oneclic
k=true (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
235. THE Ausm. APEC STUDY CTR., supra note 224, at 77.
236. AUSTA, Who are we?, http:// www.austa.net/whoAreWe.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2005) [hereinafter Who are we?].
237. Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, supra note 218, at 2.
238. Id.
239. Who are we?, supra note 236.
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Australian firms of various sizes enter American markets, indi-
cates that the agreement was not aimed solely at multinational
corporate interests .
Thus, while multinational corporate interests were involved in
the FTA negotiation process, it does not appear to have been Aus-
tralia's sole, or even major, aim in the negotiations. Instead, it
appears Australia was more interested in promoting Australian
business interests, especially the agricultural and mineral interests,
which make up a large portion of Australia's economy and ex-
242ports.
iii. Australia's Autonomous Policy Implementation
While there is some evidence of U.S. coercion or multina-
tional corporation lobbying, the largest factor affecting Australian
negotiations were indigenous Australian interests in furthering its
trade liberalization policies and economic opportunities for princi-
pally Australian businesses.243 Australia is committed to promoting
economic policies that have proven successful at growing Austra-
lia's economy, which essentially consist of trade liberalization poli-• 244
cies. In fact, Australia is lowering its tariffs unilaterally through
2005 as part of this robust policy.245
Australia has also been committed to expanding IPRs.24 Con-
sequently, Australia's decision to acquiesce to U.S. demands on
expanding IPRs is consistent with this policy. Strengthening IPRs
is unlikely to negatively affect Australia's overall economy. In fact,
stronger IPRs will likely help Australia's biotechnology industry,
240. AUSTA, Australian Business Reviews the FTA,
http://www.austa.net/reaction.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
241. Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, supra note 218, at 2 (explain-
ing that Australian agricultural, mineral, and automotive industries appear to be major
winners from bilateral FTA negotiations. None of these industries, with the exception of
minerals, involves extensive multinational corporate involvement that would be detrimen-
tal to Australian employment or business interests).
242. Media Release, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Australian
Farmers to Reap Benefits from an FTA (Nov. 14, 2002),
http://www.maff.gov.au/releases/02/02321wt.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
243. Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, supra note 218, at 2.
244. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Australia 2002,
supra note 166.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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which is considered to be "world class. 247 However, the greater
rights are expected to negatively affect Australia's computer and
technology industries.248 In spite of this negative impact, the FTA
may have created a sufficiently substantial net benefit to Austra-
lian commerce that it was willing to risk negatively affecting this
relatively small segment of Australia's economy.
C. Implications of These Results
1. Bilateral vs. Multilateral
The success that Chile had in its bilateral negotiations, espe-
cially when compared to the highly unfavorable results attribut-
able to the multilateral TRIPS negotiations, suggests that the best
forum for less developed countries are bilateral negotiations.2 0 Bi-
lateral negotiations allow each country to fully analyze the claims
made by its trading partner and discern which are "false hopes"
and which are not. This is particularly true when the negotiators
are highly capable, such as the case in some less developed coun-
tries like Chile or Brazil."'
Furthermore, it appears that a multilateral setting may not be
necessary, and is likely even harmful, to less developed countries'
interests during any negotiation process. Less developed countries
are probably better off using bilateral negotiations or negotiations
between one developed country and a group of less developed
247. Compare Rasmussen, supra note 221, at 7, with AUSTL. TRADE COMM'N,
BIOTECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY OVERVIEW, (Nov. 11, 2004), http://www.austrade.gov.
au/overseas/layout/O,,0_S3-1_-2_-3_PWB1108372-4 -5 -6 -7_,00.html (explaining that
Australia considers its biotech industry, while relatively small, to be an "emerging" one).
248. LOUISE VAN ROOYEN & PETER L. HIGGS, AUSTRALIAN INTERACTIVE MEDIA
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, AUSTRALIA'S DIGITAL CONTENT FUTURE AND THE FTA:
THE VIEW FROM AUSTRALIAN INTERACTIVE MEDIA INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (AIMIA)
8, http://www.aimia.com.au/i-cms file?page=533/AIMIA FTA_PresoFinal.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2005); DR. ANDREW TRIDGELL, FTA DISASTROUS FOR AUSTRALIAN
COMPUTER INDUSTRY AND USERS (July, 2004), http://samba.org/
-tridge/ftastatement.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
249. ALLEN CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 219, at ii-iii. (explaining that Austra-
lia's copyright industries combine to comprise 3.3 percent of Australia's GDP. Moreover,
Australia is a net importer of copyright materials by over $1 billion).
250. Success here is viewed from the viewpoint that Chile wanted and won an ETA
agreement with the U.S.
251. Carranza, supra note 8, at 1051-52.
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countries, similar to the FTAA negotiations.2 This strategy pro-
vides a forum that is less likely to be overwhelmed by powerful
special interests that are capable of separating any cohesion exist-
ing within the less developed countries' negotiation tactics.z 3
2. NGO Involvement
The case study results appear to impact some aspects of the
current commentary regarding NGO involvement in intergovern-
mental negotiations.24 Specifically, the notion that NGOs should
be involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations appear to
make little sense if less developed countries are capable negotia-
tors for their best interests. Moreover, when dealing with democ-
ratically elected officials, it seems unnecessary to involve parties
that have no constituency or concrete interest in the results of the
negotiations. If the population doesn't agree with its government's
policies, it votes for a change; this is particularly true for bilateral
negotiations, where each country's interested parties have the
loudest voices in whether policies or tradeoffs are acceptable.25
Whatever positive influences NGOs have in this environment ap-
pear to be minimal, since it is unlikely that another barrier to find-
ing mutually agreeable terms would be a positive influence on a
negotiation process. 6 Additionally, it is unlikely NGOs would be
252. Compare id., with Okediji, supra note 5, at 850.
253. See id.
254. See Jeffords, supra note 9, at 987 ("NGOs can put a human face on the WTO.
However, like the humans the NGOs represent, they need to be included."). See generally,
Bluemel, supra note 9; Helfer, supra note 6, at 50 n.227.
255. The recent action by the population in Ukraine to improper and corrupt leader-
ship and voter fraud is one example of the power and voice of a democratic population
that is inherently present when two democratic countries enter negotiations. See Yuliya
Tymoshenko, Ukraine's Orange Christmas, (Dec. 23, 2004),
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/ukrainesorangechristmas.php (last visited Feb. 21,
2005)
Nobody ever doubted that Ukraine had changed vastly in its twelve years of in-
dependence. Yet, caught in the sights of a gun barrel, nobody - not even the
brave men and women who camped in their hundreds of thousands in the snow
before Ukraine's parliament - knew with certainty whether those changes had
wrenched Ukrainians from the grip of fear and apathy. The success of their defi-
ance shows the power of the idea that bewilders outgoing President Leonid Ku-
chma and his acolytes: that democracy means taking responsibility for one's fate
into one's own hands.
256. See Sell, supra note 48, at 949 (explaining that WIPO receives approximately 85-
90% of its operating budget from Patent Cooperation Treaty patent applications, which
are mostly used by global life science corporations that advocate high intellectual property
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less corruptible than government officials, particularly because
NGOs lack a connection to a democratically elected constitu-
ency.z7 Thus, even if NGOs are given a place at the negotiation ta-
protection).
257. The lack of transparency or constituency that most bureaucrat UN employees
represent creates an atmosphere that is much more likely to lead to corruption. See LISA
MEYERS, U.N. WORKER ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: FORMAL CHARGES
WERE DROPPED, BUT QUESTIONS REMAIN (Dec. 2, 2004), http://
msnbc.msn.com/id/6637384 (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). "A U.N. worker was accused of
genocide and yet was allowed to stay on the U.N. payroll... The decision not to prosecute
him was made on the grounds of expediency, not legal grounds, however the U.N. wants
to dress it up ... He killed many, many people." See also Judith Miller & Waren Hoge,
Inquiry on Food-for-Oil Plan Cites U.N. Diplomat for Conflict, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 4,
2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/international/04food.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
Reaction to the report from Congressional investigators was mostly supportive
of Mr. Volcker's work. Representative Henry J. Hyde, the Illinois Republican
who is the chairman of the House International Relations Committee, said in a
statement that the report painted a picture of 'mismanagement, neglect and po-
litical manipulation that resulted in significant corruption of the oil-for-food
program.' 'I am reluctant to conclude that the U.N. is damaged beyond repair,'
he said, 'but these revelations certainly point in this direction.' A similar, but
even harsher reaction came from Senator Norm Coleman, a Minnesota Republi-
can and chairman of the Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations, who
called on Mr. Annan to lift Mr. Sevan's diplomatic immunity immediately. 'The
report shows that he repeatedly lied to investigators, has misled the inquiry
about the source of $160,000 in cash deposits and unethically steered oil-for-food
contracts to close associates and lied about those relationships to authorities,' he
said.
Compare Ruth Gidley, UN Says Refugee Exploitation is Serious, but not Widespread,
REUTERS ALERTNET, Oct. 25, 2002,
http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/5541377.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
("It's difficult to escape the trap of those (NGO) people; they use the food as bait to get
you to sex with them"), and Joseph Loconte, The U.N. Sex Scandal, WEEKLY STANDARD,
Jan. 10, 2005, http://www.weeklystandard.con/Content/Public/Articles/00/000/005/
081zxelz.asp?pg=l (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that the sexual abuses commit-
ted, or ignored, by U.N. personnel violate the institution's Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, and the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A
2002 U.N. report characterized the sexual exploitation issue as 'a betrayal of trust as well
as a catastrophic failure of protection.'), and Mark Steyn, U.N. Forces? Just a Bunch of
Thugs, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/
main.jhtml;sessionid=EWMD2C5GC5G1PQFIQMFSM5OAVCBQOJVC?xml=/opinion/2
005/02/15/dol502.xml&sSheet=/opinion/2005/02/15/ixopinion.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2005) ("All this derives from a UN culture in which the free nations have met the thug
states so much more than half way that they now largely share the dictators' view of their
peoples - as either helpless children who need every decision made for them, or a bunch of
dupes whose national wealth you can reroute to your Swiss bank account, or a never-
ending source of fresh meat"), with Secretary-General, Report of the Security-General on
Children and Armed Conflict, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assem-
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ble, it is uncertain that they will have a positive influence.
However, for autocratic or communist governments, such
NGO involvement likely would not present the same problems be-
cause these governments are less likely to invoke policies favor-
able to the majority of their population. Instead, autocratic or
communist governments are more likely to be corrupt and thereby
advance the interest of those in power at the expense of their• • 259
populations. In these instances, NGOs, particularly those fo-
cused on increasing the financial well-being and the freedoms of
bly, U.N. Doc. A/56/342-S/2001/852 (Sept. 7, 2001), http://www.un.org/special-
rep/children-armed-conflict/KeyDocuments/Printable/Report/ A-56-342-S-2001-
852English.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) ("I sincerely hope that Member States, the
United Nations system, non-governmental organizations, civil society and others will take
decisive action to protect children and to actively dissuade, and seek to expose and sanc-
tion, those whose actions are beyond the pale. This is a matter of international coopera-
tion and political will, and it is my hope that concrete commitments will be made by the
Security Council and Member States such that all parties to armed conflict, and actors
whose conduct indirectly fuels conflict, cannot but realize that the international commu-
nity will accept nothing less than full compliance with child protection obligations and
commitments in time of war and in its aftermath.").
258. See Jacob, supra note 9, at 297 ("NGOs exert tremendous influence over large
numbers of delegates not because they are right on matters of substance, but rather be-
cause they are providing the only pro bono legal services available to delegates with no
legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly did not act as disin-
terested legal advisers, and along the way more than one delegation was hoodwinked into
believing the NGOs' all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth."); cf. STIGLITZ, su-
pra note 28, at 88
[Clountries need to consider the alternatives and, through democratic political
processes, make these choices for themselves. It should be - and it should have
been-the task of the international economic institutions to provide the countries
the wherewithal to make these informed choices on their own.. .The essence of
freedom is the right to make a choice - and to accept the responsibility that
comes with it.
259. See Pavol Stracansky, Corruption in Eastern Europe: Communism Leaves a
Long Hangover, Nov. 4, 2004, http://www.worldrevolhtion.org/article/1625 (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005); Peter Eigen, Corruption Perception Index 2004, (Oct. 20, 2004), http://www.
transparency.org/cpiU2004/cpi2004.pe-statementen.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
Corruption robs countries of their potential. As the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index shows, oil-rich Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Ecua-
dor, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela
and Yemen all have extremely low scores. In these countries, the oil sector is
plagued by revenues vanishing into the pockets of western oil executives, mid-
dlemen and local officials.
Cf Press Release, Transparency International, Public Outrage is Calling Govern-
ments to Account and Forcing Corrupt Leaders out of Office, 1 (Oct. 15, 2001),
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2001/press-release.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2005) ("Corruption deepens poverty around the globe by distorting po-
litical, economic and social life.").
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the unrepresented, could provide the necessary voice during nego-
tiations between democratic countries in a bilateral setting, in or-
der to negotiate with tyrannical or communist countries. 260 Even if
a NGO was corrupt or corruptible, its presence during negotia-
tions would not create a substantial departure from current nego-
tiation processes with a communist or tyrannical government.
Unfortunately, NGO involvement in such circumstances may
also result in a net negative impact on the very people NGOs are
trying to help. 62 For example, many academics have found that
NGOs and intergovernmental efforts specializing in providing for-
eign aid have failed miserably in achieving their goals.263 Some
economists have even determined that such groups, despite their
good intentions, have exacerbated some countries' economic prob-
lems.2 64For instance, one study discovered that when NGOs and
developed countries provided a 1% increase to these countries'
GDP, the result was a 3.6% decrease in real GDP per capita in-
come in that country.265 Moreover, aid provided to countries with
respectable governments did not improve the effectiveness of the
aid.266 Consequently, it seems that NGO involvement in any bilat-
260. This would also apply to "democracies" that are highly suspect like Venezuela,
Egypt, or Russia, where their current leaders have been elected with dubiously high ma-
jorities. These countries are slightly more democratic than China, Cuba, Iran, or North
Korea. For an example of this type of "democracy," see Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Crack-
ing Down on Caracas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 14, 2005, at 72 (explaining the
strong likelihood of fraud and coercion used by the Chavez government in the last Vene-
zuelan election. MIT and Harvard professors issued a report estimating that there was at
least a 99% chance the election in Venezuela was a fraud.).
261. See Stracansky, supra note 259; but see Donald J. Boudreux, Faulty Band-Aid,
PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., June 18, 2005, at A9, available at
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/opinion/s_345188.html (last visited June
18, 2005) ("Aid money naively paid by Westerners to alleviate Third World poverty is sto-
len or misspent by the thugs who control the governments there. Nothing is done to foster
the rule of law and private property rights that alone are the foundation for widespread
prosperity.").
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. ("[M]any studies find that aid harms economies. For example, University of
Regina economist Tomi Ovaska, writing in the Cato Journal, finds that 'a one percent in-
crease in aid as a percent of GDP (gross domestic product) decreased annual real GDP
per capita growth by 3.65 percent."'); see also Tomi Ovaska, The Failure of Development
Aid, 23 CATO JOURNAL, 175, 186 (2003), available at
http://catoinstitute.comlpubs/journallcj23n2/cj23n2-2.pdf (last visited June 24, 2005).
266. Id. (explaining that the failure of aid in the well run countries could be a result
from the "negative effects of aid on work effort and from the stipulated end uses of aid,
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eral or multilateral setting may have unintended negative effects
that warrant, at the least, a skepical view of any asserted benefits
their involvement could create.
VI.CONCLUSION
As this case study illustrates, less developed countries are not
as unsophisticated as many claim when negotiating FTAs that may
provide for stronger IPRs. Instead, each country's internal political
capacity and stability help to determine whether a country is capa-
ble of adequately representing itself in such negotiations. It ap-
pears that even where such capacity and stability are quite low, a
country is as likely to adequately represent itself as it is with the
help of NGOs. Thus, the willingness and likelihood of a less devel-
oped country with a democratic government entering an FTA pro-
viding stronger IPRs is likely to be directly related to the substan-
tial interests of each country's constituency.
which may lead to misallocation of scarce resources in the recipient country."); see also
James Soemijantoro Wilson, Note, Why Foreign Aid Fails: Lessons From Indonesia's Eco-
nomic Collapse, 33 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS., 145, 146 (2001), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3791/is-200110/ai-n8982932 (last visited June
24, 2005).
267. See Boudreux, supra note 261, at A9.
268. See Carranza, supra note 8, at 1051-52; cf STIGLITZ, supra note 28, at 32 (ex-
plaining how Ethiopia rejected IMF funding due to its concerns with the negative impacts
the IMF demands would have on their farming industry).
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